Jae Um on Power Rankings, AI, and the New Big Law Tournament

Jen Leonard: Hi everyone and welcome back to AI and the Future of Law. I’m your co-host, Jen Leonard, founder of Creative Lawyers, here as always with the wonderful Bridget McCormack, president and CEO of the American Arbitration Association. 

And we are so excited today to be joined by one of our favorite collaborators and industry thought leaders, Jae Um. Hi Jae, welcome to the pod. 

Jae Um: Hi! So good to see you guys. 

Jen Leonard: So good to see you. And we are so excited to have you here. 

Just to introduce Jae to people who don’t know her—she has been a sought-after analyst in the legal industry and a consultant for many years and has now launched her own company, Lumio. 

As part of her work—and she does so many different things—one thing that she does is annually parse the data gathered by ALM to create the power rankings. And this year, she actually took the opportunity to look back on the last five years of her analyses and produced a new set of power rankings looking at what happened in Big Law over the last year. 

So we’re going to talk all about that. 

So as anybody who listens to the pod knows, we ask all of our guests to share an AI Aha! to kick us off. So Jae, what have you been using AI for in your life that you find particularly interesting? 

AI Aha! 

Jae Um: So because the power rankings are all-consuming for a couple of weeks—it’s a really compressed timeline to crunch the numbers, surface the themes, get everything written, and get the art made—I’ve basically had no life other than the work. 

So my AI Aha! will be about the power rankings. 

I think a lot of people are curious, but I’ve never really spoken publicly about how those get made. It’s a structured scoring model—quantitative scoring. I start with 100 firms. They’re basically turning in a partial P&L. 

I have a master worksheet with about 55 component measures, and those get calculated into composite KPIs. Some of those KPIs I’ve used multiple times, but in certain years I have to create new ones. For example, in a stretch of volatility, you need measures that capture or smooth that out, so that requires new composites. 

In a typical year, it’s about three full days of just data work before I even get to how anybody performed. I’m not interpreting anything yet—I’m just doing data shaping and base calculations. Then there are many, many formulas, and sometimes more advanced data work layered on top. 

So the technology I’ve used for that has evolved quite a bit. This year, I did not type a single formula. I spoke the analytics into being. 

I did have to do some initial setup—building out Claude’s capabilities—but after that, I wasn’t doing the direct hands-on data manipulation I’ve done every year. 

It’s been about a six-year journey to try to streamline this. But what was really interesting this year was the testing. Once I had the KPIs designed, I could run multiple scenarios—different weightings—simultaneously. It made it much easier to see sensitivity. 

And then on the charting—which is actually my favorite part, because that’s where the story gets told—I could direct the AI to generate visualizations exactly the way I wanted. 

So from end to end, it’s an immensely powerful analyst. You do have to work with it—you need a clean data structure, a good data dictionary, and clear communication. But it was kind of mind-blowing. 

I’ve managed data teams before and worked with very skilled people—people with more technical expertise than me—but you always lose something in the handoff, and there’s coordination overhead. 

This year, it felt like having an extensible, on-demand team—exactly the team I needed at four in the morning. It was an amazing experience. 

Bridget McCormack: That’s incredible. When you did this a year ago, the technology wasn’t nearly as sophisticated, right? This feels like something that’s really emerged just in the last few months—what everyone’s been talking about since the holidays. 

Jae Um: One hundred percent. Last year I wouldn’t have trusted it—I would have needed a lot more setup and validation. At that point, we weren’t really sure how well it handled numbers. 

Even if you pushed things into code, the reasoning layer could still make basic arithmetic errors. Given how compressed this project is, I wouldn’t have risked the time. 

But this year, I felt very confident. 

What Just Happened?: Big Law’s New Tournament 

Jen Leonard: Super interesting. And it’s sort of a nice segue to thinking about last year compared with this year. 

Last year, your analysis was titled The Edge of Chaos. But this year, looking back, you were able to assess that the converging forces that created so much chaos actually served as a ladder. 

So what shifted in the data that made you think about the framing differently? 

Jae Um: I think the dispersion—performance dispersion. ALM has done a really great job covering that for the better part of 15 years. So the wealthy firms getting wealthier is not news. 

And then in terms of the stratification that I’m seeing, I think one of the numbers that is shocking is that the apex predators—the six firms, that’s what I’m calling them, because it describes their strategic posture and the effect that they have on the competitive context—they have 24% of market share. They have 24% of the profit pool share. 

Ten years ago, those same firms had 16%. So the rate at which profits are concentrating, and the rate at which those firms are consolidating their hold on what has to be some of the most profitable work—I think that’s quite remarkable. 

Dispersion is interesting. Concentration is interesting. The rapid growth of some firms is interesting. But for six firms to be driving that simultaneously is, I think, quite remarkable. 

Because in any business—especially a services business—it is really hard to drive revenue growth and margin growth simultaneously. That’s one of the most difficult things in business. And these firms are doing it in a sustained way. 

And it is creating second- and third-order impacts in how other firms are competing in that segment of the market. It is changing how the rest of the market looks at the title of partner, the structure of the partnership model, the size and shape of the firm, how leveraged it needs to be. 

It is changing the way people conceptualize the modern law firm. 

Jae Um: Going back to The Edge of Chaos, last year one of the sections was called “Chaos Can Be a Ladder.” And this year one of the subsections was “Chaos Was a Ladder.” 

I think times like these really highlight what lawyers actually do. What is it that lawyers actually do? Why is it that clients need lawyers in the first place? 

What are the things happening in the world that create new issues of first impression—where lawyers have to do original thinking? And what are the things where business-as-usual problems suddenly explode in volume? 

I think the causal effect of legal demand is something I really want to shift market attention to. 

The hypothesis—even 13 months ago—was that the new administration was going to make decisions and take actions that would require corporate clients to need more lawyers. I think that proved to be true. 

That demand went to some expected firms, but also some surprising firms. And the way certain segments of firms forecasted capacity into that demand and competed to capture it—that does show up in the numbers. 

I also did a lot of qualitative research, but it was really fascinating from a market evolution standpoint. I do think it was a turning point for the Am Law 100. 

Bridget McCormack: You talked a little bit already about the apex predators, which I love—that’s such a perfect phrase. 

But you actually split the Premier League into three brackets this year. In addition to the apex predators, you have the dynasty brands and the Elite Eight. 

So can you say a little bit more about what you were seeing that made a flat ranking not workable this year? 

Jae Um: Getting a little bit technical—the one metric that matters most every year in the five years I’ve done the rankings is revenue per lawyer. I think that is the most indicative, simplest, clearest metric. 

It’s essentially: how much was a lawyer worth on the open market? But if you pick that apart, it’s a per-lawyer metric. So what firms do to headcount really matters. 

What drove the bracketing this year is very discernible differences in the pace and style of headcount growth. 

There are some firms that are constantly restacking growth. They are constantly looking for the next growth thesis. They’re making investments year over year. 

Traditionally, the dynasty brands—the six firms that have long been considered the most prestigious—grow differently. They’ve been top of market for a long time, but you don’t stay there just by being old and fancy. 

They do grow. They hire bigger associate classes. They promote partners. But they tend to do it in spurts—when they have a specific strategic objective, like entering a new market or building a new practice area. 

And that’s quite different from what the apex predators are doing now in terms of how they think about the portfolio of capabilities that make up the modern elite law firm. 

The Elite Eight, I think, are either earlier in their strategic build or still defining it. Some are investing, and it’s just too early to show up in the numbers. Others have incredible reputation and quality, but maybe narrower specialization. 

Separating them out made the patterns clearer—especially the contrast between the apex predators and the dynasty brands. And that’s where the talent war is hottest. 

Talent, Leadership, and the Modern Law Firm 

Jen Leonard: So Jae, a question about the talent piece—even on the non-practice side, or the C-suite roles. You touched on this a little bit in your analysis. 

As the apex predators develop a more modern strategy for law firm leadership, what is the impact of volatility in the talent market when they are bringing on a top billing chief innovation officer or chief AI officer, and then a year later that person is lured away by another firm? 

Jae Um: So interestingly, the professional management of the firm—that is a trend that is kind of uneven. 

Just because a firm has a very corporate structure with lots of chiefs and clear functions does not mean they outperform. Some of the dynasty brands still do not have a chief operating officer. On the business side, the most senior role is often something like executive director. 

That can make it harder to compete for top-of-market business talent—like a chief AI officer or head of pricing—because those talent pools are very thin, and demand far exceeds supply. 

And yet, some of those firms without that structure are still outperforming. 

So what I would say is that the more controlling factor, especially at the very top of the market, appears to be how attuned the partners are to their clients. 

How practical are they? How much do they understand how their clients make money, how their clients’ businesses are evolving? 

If they have that attunement, they have the bankroll to go get whatever talent they need. When you’re competing from a position of that kind of advantage, you can decide when to invest. 

For example, Davis Polk has renewed its market position in a very consistent way. They start from a position of structural advantage—they are on the leading edge of financial regulation, they have deep relationships with major financial institutions, and strong pipelines to large corporates. 

Because they are so close to what’s happening in the market, even if they’re not the first to adopt new tools, when they decide it’s time, they can move quickly and get the right talent. 

The bigger question, I think, is behavioral—how world-class experts actually operate inside those environments. 

For the rest of the market, though, this is a real issue. The apex predators generally have more developed professional management structures and are hiring top-tier business talent from consulting firms, financial firms, and other professional services. 

One example that didn’t get much attention—Kirkland & Ellis now has its first chief operating officer, coming from Blackstone. 

But the thread across the top-performing firms is not just structure—it’s that they are deeply attuned to the needs of their clients. They understand the role they play in helping clients execute strategy. 

That’s what separates that top group from the rest. 

Jen Leonard: So speaking of the rest of the market—there are many firms outside of those top tiers. 

If a firm leader called you tomorrow and said, “Is there actually still a playbook if we haven’t gotten our house in order?”—what would you say? 

Jae Um: One hundred percent. 

I think we had a similar discussion last year. After Edge of Chaos, I said: the best time to plant a tree was 20 years ago. The second best time is right now. 

Even if a firm feels like it’s on the back foot, what the power rankings show this year is that position is not destiny. 

Many of the case studies I included show that if a firm has a clear sense of where it competes now—and a clear understanding of its economic role in the market—there is real upward mobility. 

What is the function you want to play? What is the proposition you want to offer clients? If you can answer those questions, there is more opportunity to move up-market than ever before. 

I actually think this should be a message of optimism—especially for newer managing partners. We are in the middle of a major generational turnover in leadership across large firms. 

There are many managing partners who have been in their roles for three years or less, and more transitions happening this year. 

Those leaders need to look at the field and ask: what is our range? Where can we go? What is the right play for us? 

For some firms, if they have the capital and momentum, they can play a very expansive game—lots of options, lots of investment. 

For others, it may be more incremental. It may be about stringing together a series of wins and building from there. 

But what’s striking is how quickly a firm can move if it has clarity and intent. The challenge is that most firms default to loss aversion rather than a will to win. 

Jen Leonard: That risk aversion seems especially challenging right now, particularly around investment. Firms want to invest in the right things, but it’s hard to know what those are. 

So what are you seeing among leaders who are actually able to make decisions without perfect information? 

Jae Um: I’m going to start with something that lawyers probably won’t love as an answer—but it is analytical, just not crisp. 

It’s trust. If the managing partner and leadership have earned and maintained trust with the partnership, they have much more room to explore and invest. 

If that trust has been built over time—if it’s part of the firm’s culture—they have more leeway to try things. 

The second answer is hope. I was recently talking to a sector leader at a top firm, and I said: I’ve met a lot of rainmakers in my career. I’ve never met a partner with a $10 million book who was a pessimist. 

Those partners are almost always pathologically optimistic. And I think the same is true of leaders who drive transformation. They are able to convey that the opportunity is real, that it’s worth pursuing, and that the firm can win. 

There’s a kind of energy there—a belief—that rallies people. It’s not easy to define, but you know it when you see it. 

Now, there is also a harder constraint, which is capital. 

Some firms are simply too constrained to invest. If their cost per equity partner is high, profits are low, and capital is limited, then most of their operating model depends on cash flow and debt. 

That creates real pressure, and it makes it much harder to take risks. Which is part of why there’s growing interest in outside investment. 

Bridget McCormack: So optimism and hope—check, check—and then having the capital structure to have room to invest. 

You taught me—I used to be one of these people who thought the structure of law firms made investment impossible. But that’s just not true. They invest—they just invest in talent. 

But now they’re starting to have this investment strategy in AI. And that looks different across firms. This is, I think, the first year you’ve actually analyzed distinct AI investment theses. 

Can you talk a little bit about those—what you’re seeing, what surprised you, what felt risky or wise? 

Five AI Investment Theses in Big Law 

Jae Um: Well, it’s early to be grading the theses. For now, I want people to understand that investment can look very different—and should look very different—depending on the firm. 

Before I get to the individual theses, I think there’s one non-obvious point that everybody knows but doesn’t really talk about. 

The core inventory of a law firm is lawyer time. 

Whether or not you like it, most firms are selling lawyer time. It is the most perishable inventory there is. Once the time passes and capacity isn’t used, you can’t get it back. And there are only so many hours you can push people to work. 

That’s something we don’t really account for when we talk about legal innovation. But it’s almost always the most important input. 

If you want to change behavior, people have to spend time and effort working differently. That’s a real cost. 

Now, just on the hard cost side—AI is becoming a meaningful line item. I’m hearing some firms say up to 2% of revenue, which is significant. 

Because it’s not just buying tools—you have to try them, integrate them, change workflows. AI is more like a utility than a tool. You have to actually do something with it. 

So the investment is more significant than it might seem from the outside. 

Jae Um: The five theses I highlighted—there are other firms doing interesting things, but I chose these because they show a range. 

Each one maps clearly to the firm’s competitive positioning, their client base, and how they compete. 

Kirkland and Cooley—I called those out because it’s very clear they are investing seriously in what an AI-enabled future looks like. 

And not a peep from either firm. Completely silent. 

So the stealth mode, kind of “skunk works” model—that’s a completely valid way to invest. 

HSF Kramer is another example. The forward-deployed engineer model—embedding technical capability into how the work gets done—that’s interesting. 

Especially because of the type of work they do. In disputes and arbitration, you’re already standing up teams to go figure out what happened in a specific situation. So that model fits. 

It’s not just “let’s add AI.” It’s aligning how AI is deployed with the nature of the client problem. 

A&O Shearman is also interesting. Legacy Allen & Overy had deep experience at the application layer—building tools for specific clients, especially in global finance. 

So their investments are aligned with their strategic advantage: access to major financial institutions and their footprint across financial centers. 

What I’m trying to show with these examples is that you can’t have an AI strategy that’s separate from your competitive strategy. 

It has to be the same thing. 

And for that reason, what firms do with AI is going to look very different from firm to firm. 

We’re not going to know immediately what’s smart and what’s not. That’s going to take time. 

Jen Leonard: Let’s talk about Ropes and Gray. They’re allowing associates to count up to 400 hours of AI experimentation toward their billable targets. 

What signal does that send, and why haven’t more firms done it? 

Jae Um: That was brilliant. 

One of the proposals I floated a few years ago was that a firm could draw a line and say, we’re not going to charge for first years—we’re going to train them intensively on AI. 

That’s a hard proposal to push through, so I admire Ropes for actually doing something close to that. 

From an economic standpoint, I think the ROI is going to be there. First years are not the most productive yet, so using that time to train them differently makes sense. 

It does take time to learn how to work with AI. And it’s only by immersing people in it that firms will find scalable applications. 

It also sends a very strong recruiting signal. 

Even if nothing else came from it, every law student will know that this is a place where they’ll be supported in learning how to practice differently. 

And firms otherwise look very similar to students. This creates differentiation. 

There’s also a strategic element. Julie Jones said that AI could enable them to take on certain middle-market work that didn’t previously fit their model. 

So it’s not just about training—it may open up a different segment of the market. 

Client Signals, Bionic Insourcing, and Invisible Market Pressure 

Bridget McCormack: I keep wondering how law firm leaders are not nervous about jumping in with both feet. When you hear—you cited both these statistics, Jae—that on the one hand, the capex spending from Big Tech in 2025, I think you said, was $380 billion, which is 2.1 times the Am Law 100 combined revenue—like, head-spinning, insane. 

Now, on the other hand, McKinsey says only 5% of companies are getting AI value at scale, which sounds right to me. I meet with a lot of companies, and they’re all over the map still. You’re just not seeing even gains. 

If you’re a law firm leader, how do you metabolize those two numbers at the same time? How do you think about them? What insight do you have about how they’re thinking? Are they just assuming the Big Tech companies obviously know where this is headed, and just because the rest of us don’t yet, we should go—we’ve got to go? 

Jae Um: You know, I hear a lot of different things from managing partners, depending on whether we’re alone or with a group of peers, or a group within the firm. 

I will say that’s one of the hardest parts of the job. There are certain things you have to think really hard about saying in public. So I think market perceptions of what Am Law 100 managing partners are thinking are full of speculation, because many of them have not yet decided what is the responsible thing to say on behalf of their firm. 

So I’ll give them a bit of a pass. But I do think they are running out of time to decide. 

By the end of 2026, the only wrong answer is saying nothing. Leaders can’t be saying nothing about AI in 2026. 

In terms of how they’re thinking, I think the ones who have the most clear-eyed, pragmatic view are the ones who are very grounded in what they sell and why clients buy from them. 

If they feel confident in that, then they feel better equipped to figure out AI. It becomes: I know my business—now show me what AI can do to it. 

Those managing partners tend to have a strong sense of direction and momentum. They are looking for the right advisors, the right professionals, the right experts. 

The ones who feel more adrift are the ones who don’t feel confident in their value proposition to clients. If their relationship to clients is more attenuated—if they’re a bit removed from that day-to-day—it’s harder to build a mental model of how these system shocks will affect them. 

And then, what the “new tournament” shows—this year’s theme—is that some of the most successful managing partners have been successful because they’re good at the talent piece. 

They’re good at recognizing talent, activating talent, and selling people on joining their platform. 

That’s going to continue to matter. But it now has to be combined with partners who are themselves very attuned to the realities of their clients. 

So that external focus—understanding why the firm exists, what’s happening in the world that creates demand for its services—that’s the through line. 

And the leaders who are most attuned to that seem the most energized right now. 

Jen Leonard: So Jae, maybe we can bring it all home. We’re talking about the sell side of the relationship, but on the buy side, there’s a lot happening in the corporate counsel suite. 

One of the things Bridget and I present about frequently is how to make sure you are in communication with your clients so you’re aligned and ahead of their expectations. But that’s not always the instinct of law firm partners. 

Your power rankings piece has a few anonymous quotes from in-house counsel that really resonated with both of us. And we’d love for you to share the one about the phone with us in particular. 

Jae Um: Yeah, that one is the most ominous, although it’s not the most abrasive. 

I think in some practices, the phone just stops ringing, and the law firm does not know why. It will be because the client found an alternative or a substitute that is fractions of the cost. 

That is something I wanted to drive home—not because I want everyone to be terrified. I think I said more than once in the article that the quotes came from very early adopter clients who are not representative of most of the buy side. 

So it’s not a clear and imminent disaster. But if you want to do a little bit of future gaming, I think that is the scenario that requires the most thinky pain. 

Because it says some of your revenue—some of your demand—will evaporate without you knowing about it. 

And the absence of something that should be there is very difficult to see. So that kind of sensing—what I call “white space attunement”—is probably one of the most difficult things you can do in strategy. 

So I think that is something that is worth a lot of consideration. 

I think the most immediate stopgap to that is for your partners to be very well positioned in terms of a trusting relationship with the house accounts—if they are truly clients that you can’t afford to lose. 

Then the partners managing that relationship have to be very good at sensing, at reading the field, at scouting, at bringing that back—really hearing the voice of the client. 

I’m talking about house accounts—$50 million or more—all deserve that level of attention for sure. But not all relationships are that big, and not every relationship is strategic. 

Where the firm does similar work across a distributed client base, where the relationship is not stable because the flow of work is not ongoing—that’s the greater risk. 

That’s the kind of market where, if a new offering comes in, the rate of adoption and diffusion will be fast, and the early signals will not be visible to law firms. 

So I think that really has to do with understanding what it is you sell now, and really thinking about how difficult it is for anybody else to do this. 

Do we really do this significantly better than anybody else? And if price is actually a significant driver of who to hire, that has to be an area for stepped-up monitoring, at minimum. 

Bridget McCormack: Yeah, one of your quotes was a GC who did a $10,000 project with a $20-a-month tool. I mean, there’s no price signal, right? There’s no demand signal. 

And so the firm that’s used to meeting that client’s needs is never going to know that they missed out on that work. That’s where the warning goes off the loudest too. 

What’s your advice to that firm that would have had that work? 

Jae Um: This one is a little hard. 

I think the senior partner of Cleary—there’s a video of him on LinkedIn that keeps coming up—where he’s talking about ClearyX, and he said part of the challenge is envisioning the business that would put Cleary out of business. Like, what does that look like? 

That kind of theoretical war-gaming, of red-teaming, of really poking and prodding—how is it that we have persisted and thrived all these years? What are our vulnerabilities?—I think that kind of critical examination of your business model is really important in disruption cycles. 

It’s actually remarkable, because he’s one of the few managing partners who has done that and is willing to speak about it publicly. 

So much of law firm management and leadership goes forward on the good feelings that we talked about—trust, optimism. It doesn’t always have to be about dodging bad news. I think the greatest leaders are able to engender hope while also talking about the hard things. 

In terms of that specific example, I think it raises another question, which is: how should this work be done? What would be the optimal way for this work to get done? 

There’s a ton that has been insourced over the last ten years. Some of it I don’t agree with—I think some work that got insourced should have stayed with providers. But there’s also way more work that’s going out to firms or even ALSPs that would be better done differently inside, because of the embedding with business processes, or the proximity required to apply legal judgment quickly. 

So I think what AI raises—the questions that AI raises that are of great interest here—and I tried to label that one, I think I labeled it “bionic insourcing.” 

When you guys talk about bionic boutiques, I hope you tack this on, because it is the other side. 

There’s going to be bionic boutiques, and I think there’s going to be bionic insourcing. And it’s going to look—bionic insourcing is going to look much more different from legacy corporate legal configurations than bionic boutiques will from old law firms. 

I think bionic boutiques will just be supercharged law firms, but bionic insourcing could look like a completely different thing. 

So I think the question still comes back to: what is the economic function we are fulfilling? 

Jen Leonard: So our last question before we send you back to be brilliant in all the places you operate—your third quote, which is the sharpest one. 

And this is, again, an anonymous quote from corporate counsel. And they say: “If a firm isn’t cannibalizing its own inefficient billable hours, we will find a firm that will.” 

Who is hearing this message and has actually acted on it? Tell us more about this statement and what it means to you. 

Jae Um: Okay, first of all, when I heard that, I got chills down my back. 

And I have stared down the barrel of some tough fee negotiations—I used to be Baker McKenzie’s negotiator—so it is a pretty tough message: if you don’t cannibalize your inefficiency, we will find a firm that will. 

I chose these three quotes because I felt they really told a story and helped people visualize different ways AI is going to hit—and in ways that are difficult to count. 

So this one, I would tie back to something I told a room full of managing partners in London three years ago: the impact of AI—it’s not going to hit like your firm fails and you get a letter signed, “Dear managing partner, it was me—AI.” 

You’re never going to have that clarity. How it’s going to feel is that the pressure gets turned up a little bit, and then a lot. 

It’s going to be harder for partners to win business. You’re going to see your inventory—your new matters—tick down. It’s going to be harder to get rates. Realization is going to slip. And it’s going to be hard to say why. 

So I think the invisible hand of the market is not actually a benign force. There are market forces that work invisibly, and that’s something I wanted to draw people’s attention to. 

And the other thing I said in that room in London three years ago was that there are probably 300 law firms of consequence operating globally right now—firms meant to survive the retirement of the name partners and do significant work for enterprise clients. 

I don’t believe there’s room for the current set of 300. 

I think it is a crowded market, because I’m not sure we have 300 management teams that are equal to the task of navigating this transition. 

I think there will be a refragmentation. I think there will be a clash of the titans in these industrial-scale firms. Some will consolidate and go after different segments of the market. Some will win, others won’t. 

But then there will be these new challengers. 

So I think what we’re seeing is a classic disruptive cycle, where incumbents face increasing competitive intensity among each other, and invisible pressure from substitutes they can’t see the whites of the eyes of yet—Norm AI, General Legal, all of these things that are popping up, and all the money going into them. 

And this is not dumb money. VC and private equity—they think about their theses differently—but they are laying a number of bets on these challengers. 

And there have been waves like this before. 

And I said on LinkedIn, the profession has survived every previous wave of disruption. It will survive this one too. 

I’m not saying that it’s over. I’m saying it’s about to get choppier. 

It’s choppy already, and it’s going to get choppier. 

But the ones that win are going to win big. 

Jen Leonard: Well, sadly, we are out of time today. But as always, I feel smarter than I did an hour ago. Thank you so much for spending your time with us and sharing your insights with the profession. 

And thanks to everybody out there for joining us on another episode of AI and the Future of Law. We’ll see you next time.